Judges 6-8

Bautista vs. Borromeo, Inc.

2009-12-19T22:47:00.002-08:00

Abelardo Bautista and Roberto Tan Ting vs.
Federico O. Borromeo, Inc., Hon. Cesar C. Cruz, Judge of the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal and Jesus Bautista, Deputy Sheriff of Manila as Special Sheriff
G.R. No. L-26002, October 31, 1969

SANCHEZ, L:

Facts: The truck of petitioner Roberto Tan Ting driven by Abelardo Bautista, the other petitioner, and the Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by respondent Federico O. Borromeo, Inc. were involved in a traffic accident along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. In said traffic accident, Quintin Delgado, a helper in Borromeo's delivery panel truck, sustained injuries which resulted in his instantaneous death. Borromeo had to pay Delgado's widow the sum of P4,444 representing the compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses due Delgado under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Upon the averment that the said vehicular accident was caused by petitioners' negligence, Borromeo started suit to recover from petitioners the compensation and funeral expenses it paid to the widow of Quintin Delgado.
At the scheduled hearing, neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared. Borromeo was thus allowed to present its evidence ex parte. On the same day, the municipal court rendered judgment in favor of Borromeo and against the petitioners in the principal sum of P4,444, and P500 attorney's fees, and costs.

Issues:
1. Is the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court unavailable to petitioners?
2. Is there excusable negligence for counsel's non-attendance at the hearing?
3. Is there obligation on the part of Borromeo, Inc. to pay Delgado’s widow death benefits?

Held:
1. Yes. A basic precept is that when another remedy at law is open to a party, he cannot sue out a petition for relief under Rule 38. Thus, a petition for relief is not a substitute for appeal. It has been held that where a defendant could have appealed - but did not appeal - from the decision of the inferior court to the Court of First Instance but instead filed a petition for relief, his petition was inappropriate as it "would amount to reviving his right to appeal which he had irretrievably lost through the gross inaction of his counsel."

2. No. Petitioners failed to make out a case of excusable negligence for counsel's non-attendance at the July 23, 1965 hearing. Their counsel, Atty. Leopoldo V. Repotente, Jr., explains his failure to attend the hearing was his reliance on the assurance of his associate, Atty. Lucenito N. Tagle, that the latter will attend to the case for him since on that same date he (Atty. Repotente) had another case before the City Court of Quezon City. Atty. Tagle in turn stated that he was unable to attend the hearing despite his promise to do so because when he transferred to his new office at A & T Building, Escolta, Manila, the record of the case was misplaced, mislaid or otherwise lost by the helpers and was not among those turned over to his possession and it was only a few days after the date of hearing on July 23, 1965, that he found the record of the case in one of the drawers of his table in his former office and it was only then that he realized his failure to attend the hearing on July 23, 1965.

We cannot view such negligence of petitioners' two attorneys as excusable. There was no plausible reason for Repotente to entrust the hearing of the case to another lawyer. His lame excuse was that he requested Tagle to attend the hearing of said case for him because he had another hearing at the City Court of Quezon City. This is unworthy of serious consideration. For, as respondents aver - and this is not denied by petitioners - the hearing of July 23, 1965 before the municipal court was set in open court during the initial date of hearing held on July 1, 1965 after Atty. Repotente consulted his calendar. When Repotente agreed in open court to set the trial of the case for July 23, 1965, it may very well be presumed that his other case in Quezon City was not yet calendared for hearing. He could not have, in good faith, agreed to set the case for hearing on the day on which he had another previously scheduled trial. Further, he failed to notify his clients of the hearing set for July 23, 1965; they also failed to appear thereat.

Nor may Atty. Tagle offer as excuse the fact that the record of the case "was misplaced, mislaid or otherwise lost." This is a stereotyped excuse. It is resorted to by lawyers in order to win new trial of the case and thereby move farther away the day of reckoning. To be remembered is that the life of each case is in its record. If the record of the case was misplaced, mislaid or lost, he should have nevertheless attended the scheduled hearing and requested for a postponement by reason thereof. But he did not. Appropriate it is to recall here that a prudent lawyer keeps a separate record or diary of hearings of cases he handles and of his professional engagements. A lawyer's schedules of hearings - intended as reminder - are not noted by the lawyer in his record of the case. That would be useless for the purpose.

3. Borromeo paid the widow of its employee, Quintin Delgado, compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses for the latter's death while in the course of employment. This obligation arises from law - Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The same law in its Section 6 also provides that "[i]n case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: ..." virtual law library
It is evident from the foregoing that if compensation is claimed and awarded, and the employer pays it, the employer becomes subrogated to and acquires, by operation of law, the worker's rights against the tortfeasor."

No need then there is to establish any contractual relationship between Quintin Delgado and herein petitioners. Indeed, there is none. The cause of action of respondent corporation is one which does not spring from a creditor-debtor relationship. It arises by virtue of its subrogation to the right of Quintin Delgado to sue the guilty party. Such subrogation is sanctioned by the Workmen's Compensation Law aforesaid. It is as a subrogee to the rights of its deceased employee, Quintin Delgado, that Borromeo filed a suit against petitioners.

PASEI vs. Drilon

2009-12-09T07:12:00.004-08:00

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc vs. Drilon
163 SSCRA, June 30, 1988

Sarmiento, J:
Facts:
PASEI, a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino wokers, male and femaale, or overseas placement challenged the constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1998 of the Department of Labor and Employment in the character of 'guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino Domestic and household workers. The said order was assailed for allegedly (1) discriminative against males or females, (2) not being applicable to all Filipino workers but only to

Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary

2009-10-06T11:25:00.003-07:00

Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts: The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Estrella

2009-10-06T11:04:00.003-07:00

City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Raymond Estrella
G.R. No. 141211 August 31, 2001

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) initiated a jail visitation program. IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited various jails in Metro Manila. In the City Jail of Manila, they found 34 prisoners, herein respondents, whom they believed were entitled to be released after deducting time allowances for good conduct in the service of their respective sentences. Respondents asked herein petitioner Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila City Jail, to effect their release on the ground that they had already served their sentences, less time allowances for good conduct. Respondents invoked Arts. 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Does the Director of Prisons have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila?

Held: No. Under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409), the Director of Prisons did not have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila. It was the Chief of Police of Manila who under section 34 of the Charter "shall exercise supervision, administration, and control over the city jail and municipal prisoners."

There is no inconsistency between Art. 99 and R.A. No. 6975. Repeals by implication are not favored. To the contrary, every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi. For there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of repugnance. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.

Senate vs. Ermita

2009-10-06T10:52:00.001-07:00

Senate of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).

The President then issued Executive Order 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.

Issues:
1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and

3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Held:
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.

3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication.

Republic vs. CA

2009-10-06T09:58:00.002-07:00

Republic of the Philippines vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106763 May 9, 2001

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts: The Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite sold lots with an approximate combined area of 3.1437 hectares, located at Barrio Salinas, in the said municipality, to private respondents' predecessors-in-interest for P188.20 pursuant to Act No. 3312 and Municipal Resolution No. 89 as amended by Resolution No. 289. Private respondents later filed an application for land registration before the CFI of Cavite, covering the lots. A decision was then rendered adjudicating to the applicants, herein private respondents, the subject parcels of land.

Twenty-five years later, the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the decision of the CFI of Cavite, and to order the restoration or reversion of the subject parcels of land to the mass of the public domain. The OSG alleged that the registration proceedings were null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the parcels of land subject thereof were still classified as forest land; that the OSG was not furnished with a copy of the application for registration and other records as mandated by Section 51, of the Public Land Act; and that the applicants have not shown possession and occupation of the lands in the manner and for the length of time required by section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.

Issues:
1. Whether the sale of communal lands of the Municipality of Bacoor to private respondents' predecessors-in-interest was authorized by law; and

2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the parcels of land covered by the decree issued on October 7, 1965 pursuant to the decision of said court of August 4, 1965.

Held:
1. ACT 3312 authorized and recognized the sale of communal lands in the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, to qualified applicants. It is error to say that private respondents, as qualified applicants, could no longer avail of the benefits of Act 3312, due to the subsequent passage of C.A. 141.

There can be no implied repeal of Act 3312 by the subsequent enactment of C.A. 141 as it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it.10 The Public Land Act is a general law governing the administration and disposition of the lands of the public domain; while Act 3312 is a special law on the sale of lands designated as communal situated in the Municipality of Bacoor in Cavite. The presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws, one is special and the other general; and this rule applies even though the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter covered by the special statute. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, a law will always be presumed valid and the first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law.

2. Yes. The Republic as petitioner, does not stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as the said parcels of land had already been declared alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion in favor of the Republic, the land recovered would not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to other private persons. It would be grave injustice and would not serve any declared national land policy to dispossess private respondents of the said parcels of land at this point, only to enable the government to dispose anew the lands covered thereby to subsequent applicants.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

2009-10-06T09:37:00.004-07:00

Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense?

2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.

3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Held:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.

2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party vs. Ang Bagong bayani- OFW LABOR PARTY Go! Go! Philippines

2009-10-06T08:44:00.003-07:00

Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party vs.
Ang Bagong bayani- OFW LABOR PARTY Go! Go! Philippines
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Herein case involves two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

Issues:
1.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

2.Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785."

Held:

1.Yes. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

2.Yes. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. (e.g. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution)

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC

2009-10-06T08:09:00.001-07:00

Erectors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 93690 October 10, 1991

NARVASA, J.:

Facts: Federico Alconcel was employed by petitioner Erectors Inc. After sometime, the latter informed the former in writing of the termination of his services on account of retrenchment.

Alconcel refused to accept the validity of the termination of his employment and instead filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter's Office of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). After due proceedings, the latter pronounced the former's dismissal illegal and directed respondent Erectors Inc. to reinstate him to his former position with full back wages, without loss of seniority rights or benefits accruing after his dismissal and to pay him for damages.

Impugning the Arbiter's decision, Erectors Inc. filed an Appeal with the NLRC solely questioning the award of moral and exemplary damages. NLRC dismissed the appeal of Erectors Inc. for failure of perfection; no proper bond having been filed within the time appointed therefor. Motions seeking reconsideration of this Resolution of February 1, 1990 were denied by the Commission, in its Resolutions of March 6, 1990 and April 27, 1990.

Issue: Are the NLRC resolutions rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

Held: Yes. The NLRC acted without lawful justification when it issued its order of October 18, 1989 requiring petitioner, among other things, to post an appeal bond within ten days or suffer dismissal of his appeal.

To be sure, the firmly-entrenched rule is that an appeal is a purely statutory right, and who would avail of it must strictly comply with its requisites. This assumes, however, that the requisites are clearly spelled out, not ambiguous, vague, or susceptible of more than one interpretation. However, Article 223 of the Labor Code and Rule 7 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals may not unreasonably be construed as not requiring the filing of a bond when an appeal is taken only from an award of moral and/or exemplary damages.

The Court finds that while Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, requiring a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from for the appeal to be perfected, may be considered a jurisdictional requirement, nevertheless, adhering to the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing the appeal on the merits to be threshed out by the NLRC, the Court finds and so holds that the foregoing requirement of the law should be given a liberal interpretation.

Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation

2009-10-05T22:00:00.002-07:00

Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, et al.
G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.

License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioner’s license stating that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.

Held:Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial." Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents’ license, is clearly not penal in character.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

People vs. Buayaban

2009-10-04T22:30:00.002-07:00

People of the Philippines vs.
Paulino Buayaban, Pedro Tumulak, Marciano Toñacao, Yoyong Buayaban and Larry Betache
G.R. No. 112459 March 28, 2003

CORONA, J.:

Facts: Appellants Paulino Buayaban, Pedro Tumulak, Marciano Toñacao, Yoyong Buayaban and Larry Betache, all armed, entered the house of Dioscoro Abonales, killed the latter by shooting him in the neck then forcibly took the sum of P30,000 from the victim’s wife. They also got the wallet of Rolando Verdida, the future son-in-law of the victim, containing P10,000 which was the money prepared by Rolando for his wedding to the victim’s daughter. After the robbery, they all fled. But, while escaping, they encountered Artemio Abonales, the father of the victim, who was responding to investigate the gunshots he heard. They all stopped momentarily and Paulino in fact tried but failed to shoot Artemio. Thereafter, all the accused continued their escape.

In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with "robbery in band with homicide." There is no such crime in the Revised Penal Code. The felony is properly called robbery with homicide. If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as "robbery with homicide" under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but the circumstance that it was committed by a band would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

Issue: Can the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the commission of the crime be appreciated when it is not properly alleged in the information?

Held: No. We cannot treat the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band because it was not alleged in the body of the information. Though it is an ordinary aggravating circumstance, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the Information. With regard to its Section 9, the use of the word ‘must’ indicates that the requirement is mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.

Province of North Cotabato, et al. vs. GRP, et al.

2009-10-04T22:11:00.003-07:00

Province of North Cotabato vs.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP)
G.R. No. 183591

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.

Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?

Held: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc., vs. CA

2009-10-03T02:55:00.004-07:00

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc., vs. Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997

ROMERO, J.:

Facts: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association was organized on February 8, 1983 as the association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC), as the sole homeowners' organization in the said subdivision. For unknown reasons, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws.

In July, 1989, when Soliven, the developer and president of LGVHAI inquired about the status of the corporation, the head of the legal department of the HIGC, informed the former that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved because, among other reasons, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code.

Issue: May the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation, as mandated by Section 46 of the Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution?

Held: No.The records of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa No. 68 suggest that automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on time was never the intention of the legislature. Moreover, the law itself provides the answer to the issue propounded by petitioner.
Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word "must" in the first sentence of Section 46 of the Corporation Code.

There can also be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws embodied in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright "demise" of corporate existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or society. In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and remedy the same.

Adasa vs. Abalos

2009-10-03T01:54:00.001-07:00

Bernadette Adasa vs. Cecille Abalos
G.R. No. 168617 February 19, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa, through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. A resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner later filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner. The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a Motion to Withdraw Information.

Respondent Abalos thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of the petition for review before the DOJ.

In another resolution, the DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language "may" utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned.

Issue: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned?

Held: No. When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same. If the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its being out rightly dismissible, such as when the accused has already been arraigned, or where the crime the accused is being charged with has already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has been committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result would not only be incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would also render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.

Tantuico vs. Domingo

2009-10-03T00:09:00.003-07:00

Francisco Tantuico Jr. vs. Hon. Eufemio Domingo
G.R. No. 96422 February 28, 1994

QUIASON, J.:

Facts: On January 26, 1980, petitioner Francisco Tantuico Jr., was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) to serve a term of seven years expiring on January 26, 1987. Petitioner had discharged the functions of Chairman of the COA in an acting capacity since 1975. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner submitted his courtesy resignation and relinquished his office to the newly appointed Chairman Guingona and applied for retirement effective immediately.

Respondent Chairman Hon. Eufemio Domingo later endorsed petitioner's retirement application to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), certifying, among other matters, that petitioner was cleared of money and property accountability. The application was returned to the COA pursuant to R.A. No. 1568, which vests in the COA the final approval thereof. Afterwards, the inventory committee submitted a report, recommending petitioner's clearance from property accountability inasmuch as there was no showing that he personally gained from the missing property or was primarily liable for the loss thereof.

Hon. Domingo then issued a Memorandum directing the inventory committee to explain why no action should be filed against its members for, inter alia, exceeding their authority in recommending clearances for petitioner and Chairman Guingona. Respondent chairman later created a special audit team for the purpose of conducting a financial and compliance audit of the COA transactions and accounts during the tenure of petitioner. When the special audit team submitted its report, it did not make any recommendation, but instead mentioned several officials and employees, including petitioner Tantuico, who may be responsible or accountable for the questioned transactions.

Respondent Chairman Domingo thereafter informed petitioner of the approval of his application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568 however, respondent Chairman added that in view of the audit findings and inventory report, payment of only one-half of the money value of the benefits due will be allowed. Petitioner Tantuico submitted a letter-complaint, wherein he cited certain defects in the manner the audit was conducted. He further claimed that the re-audit was not authorized by law since it covered closed and settled accounts.

Issue: Can respondent Chairman Domingo withhold the benefits due petitioner Tantuico under the retirement laws?

Held: No. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved was had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view of the prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and enable the respondent to do indirectly what they cannot do directly under Section 3 of the Act No. 4051.

Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood. law

PLDT vs. Province of Laguna

2009-10-02T21:55:00.005-07:00

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc.
vs. Province of Laguna, et al.
G.R. No. 151899 August 16, 2005

GARCIA, J.:

Facts: PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise under Act No. 3436, as amended, to render local and international telecommunications services. The terms and conditions of its franchise were later consolidated under Republic Act No. 7082, Section 12 of which embodies the so-called “in-lieu-of-all taxes” clause, whereunder PLDT shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to 3% of all its gross receipts, which franchise tax shall be “in lieu of all taxes”.

Thereafter, the Local Government Code took effect. Section 137 of the Code, in relation to Section 151 thereof, grants provinces and other local government units the power to impose local franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. Invoking its authority, the Province of Laguna, through its local legislative assembly, enacted a provincial ordinance imposing a franchise tax upon all businesses enjoying a franchise, which includes PLDT. In compliance with the ordinance, PLDT paid the Province of Laguna its local franchise tax liability for the year 1998 in the amount of P1,081,212.10.

Prior thereto, Congress enacted the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines. Then, the Department of Finance, thru its Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF), issued a ruling to the effect that PLDT, among other telecommunication companies, became exempt from local franchise tax. Accordingly, PLDT shall be exempt from the payment of franchise and business taxes imposable by LGUs under Sections 137 and 143, respectively of the Local Government Code, upon the effectivity of RA 7925. However, PLDT shall be liable to pay the franchise and business taxes on its gross receipts during the period that PLDT was not enjoying the ‘most favored clause’ provision of RA 7025.

PLDT then refused to pay the Province of Laguna its local franchise tax liability for the following year and it even filed with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer a written claim for refund of the amount it paid as local franchise tax for the previous year.

Issue: Does Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7925 operate to exempt PLDT from payment of franchise tax?

Held: No. In approving Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we hold that section 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

The tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in clear language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the legislature to grant such exemption. And, even if it is granted, the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.

Mutatis mutandis also applies to this case: When exemption is claimed, it must be shown indubitably to exist. At the outset, every presumption is against it. A well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim. It is only when the terms of the concession are too explicit to admit fairly of any other construction that the proposition can be supported.’

Aras-Asan Timber Co., Inc. vs. CIR

2009-09-29T05:17:00.006-07:00

Aras-Asan Timber Co., Inc.
vs. Commissioner on Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 132155, August 16, 2001

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Aras-Asan Timber Company Inc., is a duly-licensed forest concessionaire with a Timber Licensing Agreement entered into with the then Ministry of Natural Resources, now Department of Environment and Natural Resources. During the period beginning from July 1, 1980 to October 31, 1981, petitioner purchased from Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., refined and manufactured mineral oil, motor fuel, and diesel fuel oil, which petitioner actually and exclusively used in connection with the operation of its forest concession.
Pursuant to Sections 153 and 156 of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., paid and passed on to petitioner the specific taxes on refined and manufactured mineral oil, motor fuel and diesel oil fuel, which were included in the purchase price. Thereafter, on September 23, 1982, petitioner filed a claim for tax refund with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the amount of P152,794.38, representing 25% of the specific taxes passed onto it by Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc.

Petitioner filed on October 8, 1982 a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals to claim a refund under Section 230 of the 1977 NIRC. CTA rendered judgment granting the tax refund but in the reduced amount of P2,721.63. While agreeing with petitioner that a tax refund was in order, the CTA differed in its computation of the amount to be refunded to petitioner and relied on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation and Court of Tax Appeals6 as well as the subsequent Resolution clarifying its pronouncement.
In accordance with this ruling, the CTA based the 25 % refund on the amount deemed paid by petitioner under the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435, instead of the amount which petitioner actually paid under Sections 153 and 156 of the 1977 NIRC. The latter statutory provisions, which were applicable at the time of payment of the specific tax, amended Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435 by increasing the tax rates prescribed therein.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in its computation of the amount to be refunded to petitioner.

Held: No. While petitioner is indeed entitled to a refund under Section 5 of R.A. No. 1435, we hold that since the partial refund is in the nature of a tax exemption, it must be construed strictly against the grantee. Thus, we reiterate our well-considered view in Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
We have carefully scrutinized RA 1435 and the subsequent pertinent statutes and found no expression of a legislative will authorizing a refund based on higher rates claimed by petitioner. The mere fact that the privilege of refund was included in Section 5 and not in Section 1, is insufficient to support petitioner's claim. When the law itself does not explicitly provide that a refund under RA 1435 may be based on higher rates which were nonexistent at the time of its enactment, this Court cannot presume otherwise. A legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat.

Centeno vs. Pornillos

2009-09-28T01:25:00.015-07:00

Martin Centeno vs. Hon. Victoria Villaon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

REGALADO, J.:

Facts: Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00.

An information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos.

Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the submission, inter alia, that the term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.

Issue: Whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.

Held: No. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that "charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation."

That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.